The Challenges of Globalization:  The Strategic Role of Local Managers in Japanese-Owned U.S. Subsidiaries by Pucik, Vladimir
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
1-1-1993 
The Challenges of Globalization: The Strategic Role of Local 
Managers in Japanese-Owned U.S. Subsidiaries 
Vladimir Pucik 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Challenges of Globalization: The Strategic Role of Local Managers in 
Japanese-Owned U.S. Subsidiaries 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] After spending billions of dollars moving manufacturing plants to all corners of the world, and 
endowing numerous programs in Japanology in the world's best institutions of learning, Japanese 
companies have just uncovered a disconcerting truth: their competitors do not love them. Winning in 
global competition and being popular are clearly two different things. 
Keywords 
globalization, corporate, Japan, U.S., management, market, firm, product 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Pucik, V. (1993). The challenges of globalization: The strategic role of local managers in Japanese-owned 
U.S. subsidiaries (CAHRS Working Paper #93-03). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations, Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/259 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/259 
THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION:
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF LOCAL MANAGERS IN JAPANESE-OWNED
U.S. SUBSIDIARIES
by
VLADIMIR PUCIK
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
November 1992
Working Paper # 93-03
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.
It is intended to make results of Center research, conferences, and projects available to
others interested in human resource management in preliminary form to encourage
discussion and suggestions.
"ri- I-I: !,
r> / j Ii
~\ ~'ot(~
iy
,
~
"
.'
THE FEAR OF SUCCESS
After spending billions of dollars moving manufacturing
plants to all corners of the world, and endowing numerous
programs in Japanology in the world's best institutions of
learning, Japanese companies have just uncovered a disconcerting
truth: their competitors do not love them. Winning in global
competition and being popular are clearly two different things.
Reacting to this sudden realization, some well-known
Japanese industrialists, and in particular the SONY chairman
Akio Morita, called for a reexamination of the competitive
strategies of Japanese firms. Morita argued that if the Japanese
changed the way they compete in the global markets by putting
less emphasis on growth and more emphasis on profits, not only
they would be able to win the respect and affection of their
competitors, but Japanese employees and shareholders would be
better off too (Morita, 1992). The notion of "harmonization"
(kyosei) seems to replace "internationalization" (kokusai-ka) as
the new guiding light of corporate Japan.
In his specific recommendations, Mr. Morita called for the
reduction of working hours while raising both salaries and
dividends, all of this funded from increased profit margins.
These could be secured if the current market-share driven
business strategies were to be discarded in favor of strategies
focused on product profitability. This should allow Japanese
firms to pay higher salaries to their employees as well as give
more attention and yens to community and environmental needs.
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MARTIN P.CATHERWOOD UBHAffr
NEW YORK ~TAT£ SCHHOl
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR ~ELATInNS
Cornp,11 1,1"i-.1J'w<.:itv
1
All these goals are commendable from the viewpoint of key
corporate stakeholders, but the world's consumers would have to
be willing to bear the costs in terms of higher prices for
Japanese products. In a free market economy, this is unlikely to
happen. In fact, fatter profits may come only through a further
increase in the competitiveness of Japanese firms, thus leading
to even sharper conflicts with firms in the host countries.
However, the merit of Morita's proposals is not an issue
here, as the starting point of the debate should be the diagnosis
of the underlying problem, not just a review of the proposed
solutions. In this sense, the premise of this chapter is the
opposite to that of Morita: the strategic challenge to Japanese
multinationals overseas is not that they are "too competitive"
vis-a-vis their local rivals, their problem is that they are not
competitive enough.
In my view, the profit handicap of many Japanese
multinationals is not caused by a misplaced management strategy
emphasizing market share growth over profits, as argued by Morita
and others. Rather, the low levels of profits may reflect the
failure to globalize the corporate management to the degree that
it has the capacity and ability to capture the appropriate
returns from global operations. For too many Japanese firms the
slogan "think globally, act locally" is not a statement of
corporate strategy, but a reflection of the current division of
labor: the Japanese do the thinking, while the acting is left to
the locals.
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The resistance to increasing Japanese presence overseas is
dJ::"ivenby similax shortcomings of corporate management, namely
the failure to integrate the local management into the global
framework, thus 'providing the "transplants" with at least some
degree of immunity against resentment and rejection as, for
example, the U.S. firms were able to do in Europe since the era
of "The American Challenge". Nor surprisingly, the resistance to
the Japanese is again strongest in Europe, and it was upon return
from Europe that Morita wrote his now famous essay.
However, both sets of factors that put the Japanese global
firms on the defensive have little to do with their drive to
compete. Reducing the intensity of competition may therefore not
be the appropriate response. To the contrary, the reality of the
free-market mechanism is that Japanese multinationals, like firms
in every other open economy, would find it difficult to survive
without a sharp focus on competition. The vision of a "kinder,
gentler" Toyota, Matsushita or Fanuc is in the long run
unrealistic.
Past economic history shows clearly that running away from
competition undermines healthy corporate culture, breeds
complacency, and encourages short-term thinking. The absolute
pursuit of cushier margins may perhaps lead to the same kind of
competitive decline that many Western firms have been
experiencing in the last two decades. I doubt, however, that such
a competitive decline would make Japanese multinationals any more
liked, although certainly they would be less feared.
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FAILED GLOBALIZATION
From a broader perspective, Morita's pronouncements can,
therefore, be viewed as an implicit admission that Japanese
companies failed to globalize their competitive spirit. By and
large, they were not able to build up strong management teams of
local executives, who would internalize the concept of global
competition. Not only this saps the vitality of the overseas
subsidiaries, but the lack of capability to compete globally will
inevitably damage the parent company as well.
The recent deterioration of the competitive position of many
Japanese global firms in the North American market put this issue
in a sharp relief. According to the MITI 1991 survey of Japanese
companies with operations overseas and data released by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Japanese manufacturers experienced a
sharp decline in profitability in both their manufacturing and
sales operations. The US $ 1.5 billion surplus of local plants
and sales operations in 1988 turned into a loss of US $ 1.3
billion by 1991, with even larger losses expected in 1992
(Yamada, 1992).
While the overall business results may be influenced by
external factors such as the recession in the U.S., data for
individual firms show similar deteriorating tendencies. Typical
examples are the $500 mil. loss incurred in 1991 by Bridgestone
in their so-far unsuccessful takeover of Firestone, the $100+ mil
write-off by Kubota of a failed high-tech venture capital
investment, and the well-known difficulties of Sony and
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Matsushita and their Japanese competitors in the consumer
electronics business (Thorton, 1992).
Some observers see examples of failed globalization
especially in the area of sales and marketing management (e.g. De
Nero, 1990). It is being argued that the marketing strategies of
Japanese firms often do not sufficiently take into account market
differentiation. The poor fine-tuning of products limits the
value-added created in local operations. Slow and unresponsive
decision making in this area is seen as a common weakness of
Japanese global firms due to their heavy centralization and
dominance of head-office functional organizations (in most cases,
manufacturing or sales).
Slow and centralized decision making is also blamed for a
very spotty record in Japanese acquisitions overseas. Attractive
deals have to be closed quickly, yet prudent analysis of business
conditions inside the target firm is also essential. As Japanese
firms are often not able to do this in a timely manner, they
developed a reputation not only for paying too much for their
acquisitions, but also for accumulating problems rather than
assets. This applies not only to the "go-go" Japanese real estate
companies rushing to the U.S. during the cheap-yen era of the
late 1980s, but also to such conservative Japanese firms such as
Matsushita (acquisition of MCA) and Bridgestone (acquisition of
Firestone) .
It is being asserted repeatedly that these examples of
failed globalization are due to the well-known propensity of
5
\Japanese firms to rely mainly on their own home-grown managers in
directing their overseas investment activities. For example,
according to surveys of MITI, worldwide only less than 50 percent
of executive positions are filled by local nationals (MITI,
1991). In service firms, the ratio is even lower - less than 30
percent are occupied by locals. In contrast, according to the
preliminary data compiled by Japan's Labor Ministry for Western
multinationals operating in Japan, over 80 percent of such
positions are filled by Japanese.
However, the challenge of an effective implementation of
global competitive strategies goes much beyond the power, the
numbers and the country of origin of the expatriate executives.
As many U.S. multinational firms have discovered to their dismay,
merely replacing expatriates with locals does not solve the
fundamental problem facing firms in a global environment: how to
reconcile the seemingly conflicting demands of national
responsiveness and global integration (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1988; Kobrin, 1992).
The challenge of globalization is not in managing the trade-
offs among these divergent needs, but in incorporating the
conflicting strategic objectives into a new type of globally-
competitive organization (pucik, 1992). Can Japanese firms manage
this process? What role should be played by local executives in
Japanese overseas affiliates that would optimize their
contribution to the competitive strategies of the subsidiaries as
well that of their parent firms?
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THE FOCUS OF INQUIRY
This paper reviews three core issues that reflect the
globalization challenge confronting Japanese multinational
companies today. They all relate to the decision making roles and
responsibilities of locally recruited managers and executives.
However, in contrast to most of the traditional writing on
Japanese-owned operations overseas, the emphasis of the
discussion is not on the "fairness" or "good citizenship" of the
Japanese firms in terms of their employment practices, but on the
linkage of decision-making systems and management practices with
company performance.
Such an approach is necessary because, in my view, the clear
failure to increase the influence of local executives during the
past decade is at least partly due to the fact that empowering
local managers was seen by many Japanese firms only as a show of
good will, rather than a necessity of business. Yet, it may not
possible to challenge this attitude without a better
understanding of how organizational practices facing local
executives and managers working for the Japanese, as well as
their behavior and attitudes, impact the key performance
indicators.
The first issue to consider is the most general: to what
extent does the globalization of decision making (i.e. making
business decisions on the basis of a tightly coordinated global
strategy) influence firm performance, such as profitability or
market share. Also, what is the impact of global integration on
7
the job satisfaction and morale of local managers? These
questions are also addressed more specifically by examining the
correlation between global integration in specific business
functions (such as manufacturing or finance) and key performance
variables.
The second set of issues focuses on the degree of
in~~lvement by local managers and executives in corporate
decision making and its linkage with the performance of the firm.
This study examines the relationship between managerial
involvement in various parts of the decision-making process and
the key performance variables, and also analyzes managerial
preferences for changes in the decision-making mechanism in terms
of a more effective globalization.
Finally, the third core area concerns the perceived benefits
of genuine globalization. These are highlighted by comparing the
current and optimal decision-making patterns in terms of the
location of decision-making authority and the nationality of
participants, and by linking these comparisons with indicators of
subsidiary performance. Again, the two sets of decision-making
patterns are analyzed, disaggregated by specific functional
areas.
The three critical groups of issues facing Japanese
multinationals, as they deal with the demands of globalization,
are reviewed in the context of a larger study that analyzed the
management culture and effectiveness of local managers and
executives in major Japanese affiliates in the United states
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(Pucik, Hanada & Fifield, 1989). The data for this research came
from an extensive survey of top-level American managers in 32
major Japanese-owned affiliates supplemented by in-depth
interviews with local executives and senior Japanese expatriates.
The firms in the sample were mainly large and "established"
Japanese multinationals. Two-thirds of the firms studied were
engaged in manufacturing, the rest were in finance and other
services. Most of the firms were among the largest in their lines
of business in Japan, including a number of market leaders, and
also had extensive overseas business experience, the average
presence in the United states being 18 years. However, several
firms had already accumulated more than 30 years of U.S. business
experience.
132 questionnaires were distributed by mail to U.s.
executives who were at the time of the survey assigned to one of
the top three management layers in the local affiliate. 82
questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 61%, which is
relatively high for this kind of research. The complete
demographic profile of the sample was described fully elsewhere
(Pucik, Hanada & Fifield, 1989). In addition, 51 executives were
interviewed in person.
In addition, in order to understand better the perspective
of the parent firms, a number of interviews were then conducted
throughout 1990 and 1991 in the head office of the firms that
participated in the survey. In a series of in-depth interviews,
home-office executives in charge of "globalization strategy" were
9
interviewed in the form of a dialogue about the interpretation of
results from the original survey.
THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION
As proposed by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1988), the trend toward
a "transnational corporation" that balances global efficiency,
multinational responsiveness and worldwide learning, is the
dominant organizational reaction to the forces of globalization.
However, it was also proposed that Japanese firms may face a
particulary difficult challenge managing the transition from a
"global" efficiency mode of operations to a multi-focal
"transnational mode" (Bartlett & Yoshihara, 1989), because of
their fundamental weakness in integrating local managers into the
global organization.
To shed light on this issue, the degree of integration of
specific business functions with the parent company in Japan was
examined first, measuring to what extent a company was being
managed on a global basis. Predictably, the responses varied by
industry, company, and function, but in general, the local senior
managers reported a moderate but increasing level of business
integration and globalization across the board. Their
observations were confirmed during interviews with HQ staff in
Japan.
Business planning and fund procurement were two functions
that were most consistently managed from a global perspective.
These results parallel an earlier research conducted by MITI
(1991) that reported similar conclusions. Among manufacturing
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firms, a heavy emphasis was also placed on global coordination of
the parts and components networkst in particular in the field of
consumer electronicst where u.s. based operations are highly
dependent on the linkage to manufacturing facilities in South
East Asia.
On the other hand! firms in the automobile industry
expressed interest in a regionalt rather than global approach to
purchasing coordination! capitalizing on the increasing presence
of their affiliated suppliers in North America. In most cases!
however, the so-called North American HQ was still a semi-empty
corporate shell, lacking power and resources to influence the
decision making. Several U.S. executives reporting to such a
"regional center" expressed the frustration of being continuously
outflanked by their Japanese "subordinates" informally linked to
their "mother plants" in Japan.
Personnel management, management training, distribution, and
marketing were globalized the least. The weak global linkage of
management training is particularly striking! given the key role
assigned to management development in the process of global
integration (Evans, 1992). This makes it difficult to implement
two key objectives of global human resource strategies:
development of a common corporate culture as the "glue" binding
the network of subsidiaries, and career planning for high-
potential managers from the local operations. Without a global
direction and coordination, any such programs are generally too
scattered, unfocused and short-lived.
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The weakness of the global "cultural" glue came out clearly
in our interviews with local American executives. Their knowledge
of HQ strategies, policies, and culture was often minimal, even
to the point that many of them could not agree about such basic
business facts as their parent firms's sales volume and number of
employees. While poor information flow from Japan was clearly an
issue (most routine communications from the HQ still comes by fax
in Japanese), the lack of concern for the "big picture" on the
part of some of the u.s. managers was indeed striking.
utilizing the data on globalization of specific business
functions, an aggregate "globalization index" was computed. To no
surprise, subsidiaries involved in manufacturing were more
integrated on a global basis than affiliates engaged only in
distribution or finance. This reflected the well-kn~wn reliance
of Japanese overseas subsidiaries on the Japanese parent and its
manufacturing network for product design and critical components
(EPA, 1991). No major differences with respect to overall
integration were observed within the manufacturing sector, as
differer.ces in coordination strategies among individual firms
seem at this point larger than differences among sectors.
According to the data, the older manufacturing subsidiaries
were more closely integrated with the parent firm than newer
affiliates. Thus the "late-globalization" hypothesis, namely that
local affiliates will become more "naturalized" over time (e.g.
Kreinin, 1989), just as happened with most u.s. subsidiaries in
Europe, is not supported. This probably reflects the fact that
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Japanese manufacturing firms who entered into the U.S. early are
those that can benefit most from global integration and
coordination.
,
In fact, so~e of youngest Japanese-owned operations reported
most autonomy. These were mainly firms recently acquired
(however, the sample size is too small to lend itself to a
statistical test). Until the onset of the "bubble crisis",
Japanese firms were mainly content to let their new acquisitions
run as before, often even without integrating them to their
existing U.s. operations. However, because of resource scarcity
at home, and some significant management failures in the U.S.,
such a "hands-off" strategy is now being reconsidered.
The competitive advantage gained from business globalization
is clearly reflected in the survey data, as we observed a
significant relationship between the degree of globalization and
the overall performance of the subsidiary (Figure 1). A high
degree of business globalization is also strongly correlated with
the achievement of specific performance objectives, in particular
market share and speed of new product development. There was no
,
significant relationship between levels of profitability in the
subsidiary and the degree of globalization. It may be, however,
that because of transfer pricing and other financial maneuvers,
the true level of profitability is impossible to estimate.
------------------
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
-------------------
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For specific business functions, the strongest positive
impact on overall performance comes from the globalization of the
product planning, product development, research, and parts
procurement areas. Other functions have shown no significant
relationship to the level of performance. An expected negative
relationship between the global integration of marketing
strategies and sUbsidiary performance was also not observed.
At the same time, while globalization has in general a
positive impact on performance, it is also associated with lower
employee morale, and diminished satisfaction with job autonomy
and managerial role. In particular, the globalization of
marketing and personnel policies seems to have the most
pronounced negative effect. While these factors may not be
directly linked to poor business performance, they may in fact
contribute to conflicts between Japanese and U.S. managers often
reported in the business press.
In other words, the results can be best described as a
"globalization paradox". High overall integration of business
activities is strongly correlated with the achievement of m~st
performance objectives, in particular with market share, new
product development and conformance with budget. On the other
hand, high globalization is negatively associated with most
measures of job satisfaction, such as satisfaction with job
autonomy or scope of the managerial role.
The survey data illustrate an additional point that may
impact the job satisfaction of local managers and executives: the
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degree of formal autonomy granted to the subsidiaries does not
parallel a decrease in the presence of Japanese expatriates. To
the contrary, global business integration and expatriate presence
are negatively correlated. The weight of Japanese nationals among
the top management team was consistently larger in subsidiaries
where local managers reported weaker global integration. only in
the personnel area did the expatriate presence contribute to a
tighter linkage with global policies and systems.
A large Japanese staff may indicate a corporate emphasis on
"cultural" control (pucik & Katz, 1986) allowing for more
decentralization and less formal coordination between the
headquarter in Japan and the u.s. subsidiary, than in more
"traditional" Japanese firms. In other words, the overseas
operations can be integrated into the global network either
through formal reporting and planning systems, or through
informal channels of communications controlled by Japanese
expatriates.
The dilemma facing many u.s. executives working for the
Japanese is that they don't like the formal "global" reporting
system that, in their opinion, stifles the decision-making
autonomy of the local operations, but find it equally hard to
accept the extensive Japanese presence in an "autonomous"
subsidiary. However, from the Japanese HQ point, the policy
choice is not so much focused on the role of local executives,
merely on what kind of "ethnocentric" control would be the most
appropriate. Without "local" managers with a "global" mind,
15
alternative control systems, such as empowering local managers to
represent corporate interests, are not feasible.
INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING
The generally negative impact of global integration on job
satisfaction and morale among local executives can be analyzed
further by examining the degree of involvement of American
executives and managers in making critical business decisions in
contrast to the involvement of executives in the Japanese HQ or
Japanese staff dispatched to the U.S. Fifteen such decision areas
were identified ranging from the formulation of the subsidiary's
middle-range plans and the development of new products to
decisions concerning sales promotion methods and the compensation
of local executives.
Ten different decision-making alternatives (organizational
levels differentiated by national origin and location of
decision-makers) were specified on the survey form: from
decisions made solely by senior executives in Japan to those
delegated entirely to local managers in the subsidiary. Joint
decision-making patterns were also an option. Based on the
responses, the ten levels were then combined into six decision-
making modes (Figure 2).
According to the survey participants, primary responsibility
for most business decisions today still rest with Japanese. Out
of all decision-making points examined, 47 percent involved only
Japanese staff, including 22 percent where the decision-making
responsibility was located exclusively in Japan. In contrast,
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American executives maintained exclusive decision-making
prerogatives only in 18 percent of the cases. When the u.s.
managers were involved in HQ decision making, it was mostly
together with their Japanese colleagues resident in the u.s. Even
then, local executives were not involved in more than 53 percent
of all decisions.
------------------
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
-------------------
The functional areas where the local executives were most
heavily involved are primarily in the marketing domain, e.g.
product pricing, sales and profit targets, and sales promotion.
This again partly contradicts observations made by DeNero (1989)
who attributed the low profitability of many Japanese-owned u.s.
operations to insufficient input of local marketing executives
into the decision-making process. The survey data indicate that
the cause of poor performance may not be the lack of local
decision-making authority in the marketing area, but a weak
linkage of short-term operational decisions with the strategic
direction of the firm.
Interviews confirmed the observations from the survey. Most
American executives asserted that strategic planning activities
were performed mainly in Japan. The U.S. side supplied schedules,
forms, and numbers, but was not integrated into the planning
process at the head office. Only a few of the local executives
that were interviewed had any clear understanding of what the
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corporate long-term plans and strategies were. Many appeared to
have a limited time horizon defined by the length of the current
budget cycle in the subsidiary.
Comments from a banking executive - "I don't know if there
is a five-year program for building a long-term position. They
probably have such a plan in Tokyo, but I have not seen it." -
reflect a general feeling expressed by many o~her U.S. managers.
clearly, the long-term focus, presented so often as one of the
core values of Japanese management culture, does not assert
itself in the overseas subsidiaries - at least not from the local
perspective. The lack of input into the strategic planning
process was therefore a common source of frustration for local
management.
Predictably, local executives and managers are least
involved in decisions concerning core research programs in Japan,
and the establishment of new subsidiaries, factories, and
branches. However, the specific decision-making pattern varied
not only by firm and function, but often within a firm. Paradoxes
were frequent. In a securities firm, only very broad limits were
set by Tokyo on risk exposure -- a key strategic indicator in
this business -- but even routine space decisions needed to be
cleared by the headquarter.
The actual strategic planning mechanism varies by firm,
although in general a typical medium-term plan would be less
specific in comparison with business plans most American
executives were used to in their previous jobs. While some may
18
vlew this as an advantage and an opportunity to take the
initiative, the lack of specificity was often disturbing: "Not
really being on the inside and not knowing the real direction of
the bank, we surrendered planning to Japan," acknowledged another
high-level American banker.
To complicate matters, the involvement of local executives
in strategic planning was determined as much by the "credibility"
of individuals as by their formal position in the organizational
hierarchY. Credibility with the Japanese was not, however, gained
from a well-designed strategy of career development, or from
long-term appraisals of managerial performance, which most
Japanese firms in the U.S. still lack. It was usually deeply
personalized and dependent on a relatively unpredictable
combination of "soft" managerial traits and behaviors, and on the
sponsorship by influential Japanese.
In the survey, local executives were also asked to indicate
where, based on their personal judgement, the individual business
decisions should be made (Figure 2 above). Not surprisingly, they
would like to see more decisions delegated to the local
management. However, because of the highly competitive
environment, they also do not see a far-reaching decentralization
as very desirable at this point in time. Joint decision making by
transnational teams involving executives and staff at the
Japanese parent firm, Japanese expatriates, and the local
management staff was by far the preferred pattern of decision
making.
19
It should be pointed out that such a "global" perspective is
fairly unique among most local managers of multinational firms.
For example, data collected in Japan show that local managers
working for Western multinationals strongly believe that a
unilateral decentralization of decision-making authority would be
most desirable. The HQ influence is seen mainly as a negative
factor in local performance (pucik, 1991). In contrast, most U.S.
managers working for the Japanese see global coordination as
essential for maintaining the competitive advantage. They just
would like to take a greater part in this process.
The key question remains, however, whether the desired
~ncreased decision-making involvement of local executives would
have a positive impact on the performance of Japanese
subsidiaries. While absolute proof of such a "what if" scenario
is, of course, not feasible, it may be possible to estimate the
direction of the impact of increased shared decision making by
analyzing the existing relationship between local management
participation in the decision-making process with the subsidiary
performance.
This can be done by computing correlations between several
key performance measures (level of profits, market share,
employee morale, and overall performance relative to the
industry), as reported by local managers, and the degree of their
involvement in the decision making relevant to the specific
business areas and functions. The key observations are presented
in Figure 3.
20
-------------------
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
-------------------
The data suggest an across-the-board positive contribution
derived from a localization of the decision-making authority to
most performance measures. As can be expected, among all
performance indicators, employee morale is most affectea by the
degree of involvement in key decision-making areas. However, what
is most relevant to concerns expressed by Akio Morita, the
profitability measure is strongly associated with an increased
input from local executives on issues related to business
planning and development of products for the u.s. market.
Market share performance was positively influenced by the
involvement of local managers in a plan formulation, product
design and development, and in decisions about promotions and
compensation of local executives. The latter indicates
substantial opportunities to improve the alignment of the reward
and recognition systems with corporate business objectives.
Again, local participation in the marketing domain (sales
pricing, margins, and sales promotions) did not come out as
significant.
The involvement of local executives and managers in
corporate strategy planning and new product development is
consistently among the strongest indicators of subsidiary
performance. In fact, these two variables are the only two
impacting the overall performance level. From this perspective,
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the business logic supporting local participation in strategy
formulation seems to be overwhelming.
GLOBALIZATION GAP AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
The latent benefits of increased participation by local
executives in corporate strategy determination can be further
illustrated by comparing the current and perceived optimal
decision-making patterns, and then correlating these comparisons
with indicators of sUbsidiary performance. In order to do that, a
"globalization gap" index was computed from the two sets of
responses regarding the location of decision-making
responsibility, as the difference between where the key decisions
are made today, and where they should be optimally made,
according to the survey respondents. The correlation of the "gap
index'''' with principal performance measures is presented in
Figure 4.
------------------
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
-------------------
In the majority of decision-making areas, as well as in the
aggregate, the size of the "globalization" gap was negatively
correlated with most performance measures. Subsidiaries where
local executives perceived a smaller globalization gap performed
significantly better. In seven out of the eight key decision-
making areas, the globalization gap had a negative impact on
market share, in six out of seven key areas, it had a negative
impact on the level of profits and overall performance. Not
22
surprisingly, employee morale was adversely affected by the
globalization gap in all decision-making areas.
Product development including design changes, and the reward
and recognition systems (promotions and compensation), were the
two decision-making areas where the globalization gap had the
most consistently negative influence on subsidiary performance.
Two of the marketing decision areas, product pricing and margin
determination, were also shown as being sensitive to the size of
the globalization gap. This may perhaps explain some of the
observations listed by DeNero (1990).
While these results further reinforce the earlier findings
about the relationship between the involvement of local managers
in decision making and corporate performance, some caution in
interpreting them is in order. It cannot be ruled out that the
responses to the survey may contain a certain bias, as it is
likely that the globalization gap is probably most apparent in
low-performing firms. Poor business results are often a priori
attributed by local executives to a lack of their influence and
input into the decision-making process -- in this data set,
employee morale and globalization gap in plan formulation exhibit
the highest correlation.
On the other hand, however, interviews with local executives
again and again highlighted the general unhappiness of most
American executives with their exclusion from the strategy
formulation process. This was often attributed to the Japanese
unwillingness to share strategic information because of their
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(often legitimate) fears that local managers may leave the firm
and take the knowledge with them. Thus a vicious circle is
created: local managers leave because they object to being
excluded from the inner core, which then serves as a
justification for the exclusion of their successors.
The formal reporting structure of many U.s. affiliates
further complicates the picture. Although many local
manufacturing operations are nominally autonomous from product
divisions in Japan, this is not always the case in reality. The
"behind the scenes" influence was quite frustrating to many U.S.
executives who felt locked out of the critical stages of the
planning and decision-making processes. The frustration was often
exacerbated by perceptions that many of the Japanese expatriates
involved in these negotiations are primarily representatives of a
particular factory or division who do not put much value in
protecting the interest of the American subsidiary, and sometimes
even of the global firm as a whole.
In this respect, many executives both in the U.s. and in
Japan pointed out the critical "bridging" role of Japanese
expatriates. Their willingness and ability to share with local
managers information on developments in the head office was an
important factor influencing the perception of local executives
about their role in the firm. Influential local executives do not
resent their Japanese "shadows", but actively seek out the very
best they can get to work with them. "To be successful here,"
commented one such local senior executive, "you need an effective
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'shadow', someone who can deliver for you, someone who has the
respect of the Japanese organization."
It has often been said that the dominance of Japanese staff
in the decision-making process is caused by the relative "youth"
of Japanese multinationals in contrast with their more matured
Western counterparts. However, neither the survey data, nor the
interviews, provide much support t0r this hypothesis. To the
contrary, in many firms, the frequency of top-down decision
making dominated by the Japanese was reported to have increased,
rather than decreased, over time. A changing role of the Japanese
expatriate staff was often the issue.
An American executive remarked in a candid interview:
"
In
the past three years, there has been a major change in the
approacn to the Japanese market by Japanese firms in my business.
Previously, American management was in the forefront and was
strongly involved in establishing goals, strategy, and tactics.
The Japanese operated as controllers, auditors, and communicators
between the Japanese HQ and the U.S. subsidiary. Today, Japanese
managers -- the new breed -- believe that they are smarter than
Americans and can be in "line" positions."
According to observations made by the HQ staff in Japan, the
shift in the mode of control was mainly due to the increased
strategic value of the local investment. The term "globalization"
to this Japanese firm as well as to many other firms with a
similar philosophy of overseas expansion, means mainly an ability
to manage globally with a core Japanese management staff. When
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globalization implies getting by without the locals, it is no
surprise that there is no love lost.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The data from the survey and the interviews show that market
share continues to be an important strategic objective of
Japanese subsidiaries. At least in manufacturing, market share in
conjunction with continuous cost reduction programs is expected
to translate into increased margins and profits. High margins
without the benefit of market share protection are seen as
vulnerable to attacks from determined competitors. This business
logic served Japanese finns well in the past, and the current
rhetoric on "kyosei" notwithstanding, it is doubtful that they
can shift gears in the near future.
However, as pointed out earlier, the pressures for higher
profits are real and are not likely to diminish in future. It is
doubtful that Japanese overseas subsidiaries, and in particular
those in the U.S., can cope with the harsh environment without
making sure that their local managers and executives become true
partners in the global decision making. As shown repeatedly in
the analysis presented here, this is not a matter of "good
citizenship". Empowering local management is, first of all,
"good business", essential for success in a global competition.
In addition, without opportunities for meaningful local
input into corporate-level decision making, Japanese firms will
not even be able to retain for long the management talent they
desperately need. No one is immune from competition for capable
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people, as was recently demonstrated by the defection of the top
local executives at Honda, a company aspiring to become the first
true Japanese "transnational".
However, more is involved in restoring profitability to
overseas subsidiaries than just avoiding local executive
turnover. Many American managers working for the Japanese see
strategies to increase profitability as a futile effort, as
subsidiary profits are regularly transferred to Japan. This is
not so much an issue of tax avoidance (although at present the
u.s. tax authorities are reviewing closely the tax returns of
most major Japanese firms). It is more a matter of accepted
corporate policy that profits are to be channeled to the home
office or home division, often with the blessing of the local tax
code. This does not make much difference to the fortunes of the
expatriate Japanese, but it has a considerable demotivating
effect on the local managerial staff.
In this situation, it is only natural that local executives,
when left with a choice, prefer to invest in building the market,
rather than to concentrate on making the market profitable, or
else they simply stop being concerned with profitability at all.
When plans come from above, and it is virtually impossible to
attain high profitability for local operation, why try at all?
Thus, any serious attempt to increase profitability on a global
basis must first deal with restructuring the "who and where" in
terms of decisions on strategic objectives, to be able to draw on
resources and capabilities worldwide.
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In order to support integrated decision making, the reward
and recognition system for local managers and executives will
have to be aligned with global objectives. Paradoxically, for
Japanese firms to move in this direction, they need first to
become more "Japanese". They need to learn to manage their local
staff with the same care and determination that they show at
home. This must start already at the entry level, with mere
efforts dedicated to attract qualified management candidates. In
order to do so, Japanese companies need to offer careers, not
just jobs -- just like they do in Japan.
Because at least some experience in the parent firm is
essential for a succesful career with most Japanese companies
(just like in any multinational firm), the availability of
meaningful career opportunities for local executives at the head
office in Japan is the benchmark of a company's commitment to
true globalization. To prepare managers to take advantage of
these opportunities then requires a substantial increase in
investment for training and development. Only then is the full
integration of local managers into the global network possible.
There is no doubt that the severi~y of global competition
will force many Japanese multinationals to rethink their policies
with respect to local management, in particular in the developed
economies of the u.s. and Europe. They have no choice, if they
want to survive. However, this will not happen automatically as
companies mature, but only through committed effort, continuous
experimentation, and trial and error.
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The strength of excellent global companies is in their
ability to capitalize on internal diversity. It is this diversity
that promotes the flexibility and innovation needed to compete
globally. Developing people who can manage effectively in a
heterogeneous environment is not easy, and to maintain a steady
Course toward real globalization will be the ultimate test of
corporate leadership. This is what the top Japanese
industrialists should be concerned about.
\
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